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part from the work of a number of contemporary philosophers, the theory presented is essentially nonreductionist, but contains qualifications and safeguards sufficient to distinguish it from many so-called
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THE PROBLEM
Any sufficiently nuanced account of justified testimonial practice will permit hearers or
addressees in certain circumstances to suspend judgment on the truth of some of a
speaker’s assertions based solely on membership in a group to which the speaker belongs.
C.A.J. Coady, for example, who over a decade ago inaugurated the contemporary
debate on these topics, maintains that it is rational for an addressee to suspend judgment
on the truth of the claims of “government spokesmen ‘briefing’ the press on the details of
a war their masters are currently waging” (Coady 1992, p. 196). This is despite the fact
that Coady is a proponent of the view that, in general, testimony must be treated as
innocent until proven guilty. Jonathan Adler advances a similar position, noting that:
We draw all manner of distinctions between classes of potential informants. Car salespersons are
not as trustworthy (in their role) as librarians; professional journalists are more reliable than the
popular press; Consumer Reports is better than your neighbor for deciding whether a particular car
is worth buying (Adler 2002, p. 156).

And even the famous Scots philosopher, Thomas Reid, sometimes referred to as a
“fundamentalist” on the testimony issue, realized that “knowledge of human life, and of
the manners and characters of men” – what he called “proper culture” – leads one to:
…suspect testimony in some cases, and to disbelieve it in others; [it] sets bounds to that authority
to which [reason] was at first entirely subject (Reid 1997, p. 195).

Why do the authors of these accounts allow for this sort of skepticism? Why must
they? Clearly, they are picking up on something that people actually do, as their examples
illustrate. But it is more than this. They are also picking up on a way of reacting to
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testimony that is, in many cases, overwhelmingly supported by the available evidence in
that case.
For example, it is a little-known fact that, when it comes to ground-based
witnesses of mid-air airplane collisions and explosions, the United States National
Transportation Safety Board only gathers testimony to satisfy public demand and the
various statutory requirements. In making its final judgment, the Board all but ignores
these carefully accumulated accounts (Wald 2002, p. 3).
Hearing this, one well might wonder what is wrong with the National
Transportation Safety Board. But once one knows more about what is going on here, the
question is: what other policy could the NTSB have reasonably adopted? For the Board
has before it ample evidence that ground-based observers are especially unreliable in
cases of this kind. To give one notable example, when American Flight 587 crashed near
Kennedy International Airport in November 2001, the NTSB interviewed 394
eyewitnesses, of these:
…52 percent said they saw a fire while the plane was in the air. The largest number (22 percent)
said the fire was in the fuselage, but a majority cited other locations, including the left engine, the
right engine, the left wing, the right wing, or an unspecified engine or wing. Nearly one of five
witnesses said they saw the plane make a right turn; an equal number said it was a left turn. Nearly
60 percent said they saw something fall off the plane; of these, 13 percent said it was a wing. (In
fact, it was the vertical portion of the tail.) (Wald 2002, p. 3)

In 2003, another US regulatory agency, the Federal Trade Commission, issued the
following advice to potential consumers of so-called “diet pills”. Unless you have good
reason to think otherwise, they said, treat as doubtful all claims made by the
manufacturers and purveyors of these products as to their safety and efficacy. Again, one
might wonder what is going on here. Is this some sort of conspiracy against the diet pill
industry? Is it fair to the “honest” diet pill manufacturer, who is being punished for
others’ misdeeds?
But again, under the circumstances, how else could the FTC have advised? For,
although there is in the United States, no regulation of the manufacture and sale of such
products, there are restrictions on how they can be advertised and on the claims that can
be made on their packaging. And, in enforcing these restrictions, the FTC, since 1994,
has sued more than one hundred diet pill companies for making false or misleading
claims. Moreover, despite this record of vigorous (and successful) prosecution, in a study
conducted by the Commission in 2003, it was determined that half of all weight-loss ads
in the previous calendar year contained such claims (Specter 2004, p. 64).
That some provision must be made in one’s account of justified testimonial
practice for cases of this kind, therefore, is clear. There are, in fact, instances where one
has reason to believe that the members of a class C to which a speaker S belongs are, to a
significant degree, likely to utter falsehoods with respect to a certain range of subjects
due in a crucial respect to their membership in C.
What is less clear is exactly what form such provision must take. For, while the
NTSB and the FTC cases are illustrative, they are by no means typical of cases of this
kind. For one thing, in the NTSB and FTC cases, there was an extensive preliminary
accumulation of relevant data using controlled research procedures. This resulted in a
wealth of clear-cut, well-founded evidence indicating that a large percentage of the
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respective populations in question were uttering falsehoods. For another, in each of these
cases, there was a ready explanation for the utterance of those falsehoods by those
populations that is directly connected with their membership in a particular group or
class. In the NTSB case, it was membership in the class of ground-based observers of
aerial phenomena, where issues of competence arise. In the FTC case, it was membership
in what we can call “the class of unregulated hope peddlers”, where traditionally issues of
sincerity have been a problem.
In the vast majority of cases of this kind, however, the addressee who is moved to
suspend judgment based solely on a speaker’s group membership has nothing like this
level of evidence available. More typically, she or he relies on personal experiences and
background beliefs. But even in those instances where the evidence that is being utilized
comes from an official source, impressions, anecdotes, and various unexamined
background beliefs can be a major factor.
A good example of this can be found in one of Joseph Mitchell’s famous New
Yorker profiles, wherein he recounts the career of a New York City police captain, whose
job it was to track down and prosecute so-called “gypsy” fortunetellers in Manhattan in
the 1930s and 40s (Mitchell1992). According to this captain, vast numbers of “gypsy”
fortunetellers were involved in various sorts of extortion rackets during this period and
various government and law enforcement bodies often called on him to give expert
testimony on this topic.
However, as the captain himself admitted, at no time did his evidence rise above
the anecdotal. No comprehensive study of the phenomenon of “gypsy” fortunetelling was
done by the New York City Police Department during this time. And, as a result, there
was no clear indication of what percentage of “gypsy” fortunetellers were involved in
extortion rackets.
And yet, while these are obviously flaws in the evidence that the captain provides,
are they sufficient to undermine his contention – justified, as he believes, by his extensive
experience – that the public should be wary of Manhattan’s “gypsy” fortunetellers? Does
it undermine the propriety of individual Manhattanites using his claims as a basis for
suspending judgment (in lieu of any other evidence) on an individual fortuneteller’s
assertion “I may be a fortuneteller, but I’m no extortionist”? On the one hand, it seems
impractical and unhelpful to the cause of truth to require of every claim of this kind
extensive research and documentation in line with the highest social science standards.
But on the other, without a set of clear justifiable guidelines for cases that fail to meet this
standard, we run the risk of being unable to distinguish in a principled way between the
kinds of cases that Coady, Adler, and Reid have in mind and instances of prejudice,
partisanship, and pathological mistrust.
In what follows, I shall attempt to provide such a set of guidelines. In addition, I
shall provide an illustration of how I believe these guidelines work in practice, how they
make sense of and provide a model for proper testimonial practice. In doing so, I shall
focus on a type of case where the issue of group membership relative to personal
credibility is often at stake: those situations where representatives of two or more quite
divergent groups of individuals are engaged in a dispute over a fundamental political,
religious, moral, cultural, or historical question. For in these cases it often happens that
mere membership in one of the other groups involved in the dispute is enough to
convince members of a group being addressed that what those others have to say about
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their intentions, goals, experiences, and beliefs is not worth being considered. It must
instead be treated as doubtful until independent corroboration (preferably by an
individual or group of individuals not from the suspect group or groups) is obtained.
AN UNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION
Before I lay out what I take to be a set of proper guidelines, however, I would first like to
examine a possible alternative solution to this problem and explain why, despite its initial
allure, this is not the right way to go.
Notice that in the accounts of testimonial practice referred to so far, there is a
single underlying assumption regarding the proper attitude of addressees towards the
testimonial assertions of those that address them. Addressees must have a reason for not
accepting those assertions. The proper attitude towards diet pill manufacturers, groundbased observers of mid-air airplane accidents, Romany fortunetellers, and all the rest is
one of acceptance of their claims unless and until one has good reason to do otherwise.
This assumption is part of an overall view of testimonial practice and its value
that, for the purposes of discussion, can be expressed as follows:
If, on an occasion O, H has evidence to believe that P solely on the basis of an
assertion by a speaker S to H that P, then, on O
(1)
S will have made an utterance U and in so doing “testified” that P to H,
and
(2)
H will be non-culpably unaware of the existence of
(a)
A reason R to believe that S is insincere or incompetent
with respect to U, and
(b)
A reason R to believe that P is false or very unlikely.
The problem described in the first section of this paper arises from the fact that writers
like Coady, Adler, and Reid have typically allowed what is represented here as clause (2)
(a) to cover two kinds of cases. First, the kind of case where one has a reason specific to
S to believe that S is incompetent or insincere: say, a track record of deception or
unreliability on S’s part with regard to a particular topic. Second, the kind of case where
the reason is connected with the doings or characteristics of a group or class to which S
belongs.
As we have seen, one would not want to forbid reasons of this second kind. Given
the overall theory in which it is embedded, having a clause (2) (a) without allowing for
the possibility of these sorts of generalizations would be an invitation to gullibility,
seriously hindering the slow ascent from intellectual tutelage to rational maturity that
Reid, for example, describes in his Inquiry (Reid 1997, p. 195).
But rather than trying to set conditions on the sorts of reasons that would get to
count here, perhaps the simpler and better motivated response is just to get rid of the
theory altogether. After all, the only reason why cases of the second kind need to be
included under clause (2) (a) is that otherwise the theory in which the clause is embedded
justifies too much. Why not just pull back from this level of justificatory force up front?
Rather than saying that addressees have evidence for the assertions of those that address
them unless they have some reason to believe otherwise, why not just enjoin them to
adopt an attitude of initial neutrality? Addressees could come to testimonial interactions
with no preconceptions about the assertions being made or those who were making them.
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And they could change their views one way or the other on the basis of evidence
provided through the course of that interaction. Expressed formally, the view might look
something like the following:
If, on an occasion O, H has evidence to believe that P solely on the basis of an
assertion by a speaker S to H that P, then, on O
(1)
S will have made an utterance U and in so doing “testified” that P to H,
and
(2)
H will have become aware at O of the existence of a reason R to believe
that S is sincere and competent with respect to U.
Such an approach, if adopted, would certainly help to alleviate some of the
problems associated with the type of case referred to above: fundamental values disputes
among representatives of highly divergent groups. For example, it would make it difficult
for the members of such groups to treat the testimony of those who belong to their own
group as worthy of greater credence than the testimony produced by the members of the
other groups present.
In addition, it would make it difficult for them to minimize or block whatever
evidence might be presented in the course of the testimonial encounter in favor of the
sincerity and competence of the members of those other groups.
And, finally, it would do all this, while exempting addressees from the sorts of
commitments that they would have under the other theory, where adherence to this sort of
case-by-case strategy would inevitably result in a higher level of naïve belief.
It is true that this theory generates these effects only because it requires
addressees to come into testimonial interactions believing no one. In this respect, it may
sound as if the suggestion is just to extend one’s various prejudices and suspicions to all
of humankind.
But there is a big difference between coming into a situation with what one thinks
of as evidence in favor of the unreliability or insincerity of a group of individuals and
coming into a situation in a position of neutrality. In the latter case, evidence presented in
the context of the testimonial encounter can function as evidence in favor of competence
and sincerity. In the former case, prior evidence of the group’s untrustworthiness may
make it difficult for such a case to be established.
In addition, in the former case, lack of belief or suspense of judgment is based on
something about the individuals themselves – the groups they belong to – and invidious
comparisons are being drawn. In the latter case, the lack of belief or suspense of
judgment is a purely formal requirement, based only on a set of very general beliefs about
the nature of evidence, belief, and the sorts of scenarios that are likely to play out around
them.
But these various practical advantages are not the only points that can be made in
this theory’s favor. Important theoretical considerations provide support for it as well.
The first of these has to do with the structure of the account relative to the
structure of the account of testimony that serves as its rival. As Jonathan Adler reminds
us, the distinctive thing about the rival account is its prescription of a particular kind of
default rule with respect to speaker assertions. What it says, in essence, is that the
addressee has evidence for some proposition based solely on its being asserted by some
speaker, unless the addressee is aware of some reason to believe otherwise. And what
this means, says Adler, is something along the following lines:
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If the condition is met, then the act is done. Satisfaction of the “unless” clause need not be checked
in advance. It is an option to intervene; if it is not exercised, the act or routine goes ahead
regardless. (Adler 2002, p. 154)

But is this how individuals actually treat each other’s testimony? Is this the way
they must? Elizabeth Fricker, for one, has serious problems with this view and has
written extensively on the topic. As she sees it, such a “default view” of testimony neither
conforms to our practice, nor is it, as she puts it, “epistemically responsible” (Fricker
1994, p. 148). To the contrary, she sees such a view as a “charter for gullibilism”
(Fricker 1994, p. 145) and insists that in every testimonial interaction, “a hearer should
always engage in some assessment of the speaker” (Fricker 1994, p.145).
On Fricker’s view, such an assessment need not be terribly grueling. One need not
engage in what she calls “an extensive piece of MI5-type ‘vetting’” (Fricker 1994, p.
150). Rather, she says,
…my insistence is much weaker: that the hearer should be discriminating in her attitude to the
speaker, in that she should be continually evaluating him for trustworthiness throughout their
exchange, in light of the evidence, or cues available to her. This will be partly a matter of her
being disposed to deploy background knowledge which is relevant, partly a matter of her
monitoring the speaker for any tell-tale signs revealing likely untrustworthiness. This latter
consists in it being true throughout of the hearer that if there were signs of untrustworthiness, she
would register them, and respond appropriately. (Fricker 1994, p. 150)

But weaker or not, the implication is clear: epistemically responsible addressees
constantly monitor those who are addressing them, looking for evidence as to their
sincerity and competence relative to what speakers have to say.
Another theoretical consideration in favor of the case-by-case neutrality approach,
says Fricker, is that it more closely models what it is that we want when we engage in the
practice of producing and receiving testimony. What the default rule gives us is reason to
believe that testimonial assertions as a whole can be relied upon. But this is not the proper
locus for the evidential or justificatory question. This is because what we want to know
when we want to know whether or not to trust testimony, she says, is whether or not to
trust this particular instance of testimony, not whether “testimony is generally reliable” or
“most assertions are true” (Fricker 1994, p. 134).
Certainly, there are those who think that the goal of a properly constituted
epistemology is to determine whether or not these latter claims are justified. But, as
Fricker sees it,
The project of trying simultaneously to justify all of our beliefs which rest in any way on
testimony (or equally, to justify a single testimony-belief, but without appealing to any beliefs
based on testimony) is not one that is properly embarked on, and we certainly do not need to seek
to found these beliefs as a totality on something else. (Fricker 1994, p. 136)

Those who do attempt to embark on such a project have, according to Fricker, simply
succumbed to a “foundationalist yearning to provide credentials for our system of beliefs
from outside that system” (Fricker 1994, p. 136). They do not realize that even if one
could provide such credentials, the resulting general justification would not work. For it
would be
6
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…neither sufficient nor necessary evidence to justify belief, on a particular occasion that this
speaker is trustworthy with respect to this utterance of hers, which is what it takes to justify belief
in what she has thereby asserted. (Fricker 1994, p. 134)

As Fricker sees it, any default rule theory of testimony, in trying to provide such a
general justification, will come up this problem. And thus even if per impossibile this
were the right account, hearers or addressees in their everyday testimonial encounters
would still need to evaluate each instance of testimony independently from the rest.
Let us set aside for now the deeper theoretical issues brought up by this latter
point and focus instead on the question with which I began this section. Does the case-bycase approach give us a principled way of avoiding the problem of group stigmatization
that sometimes occurs in testimonial interactions?
Such an approach certainly captures a very common sentiment in contemporary
Western culture: that a truly open-minded individual is one that treats each person and
each situation as unique. Moreover, in its insistence that our normal testimonial encounter
involves not a default acceptance of a speaker’s assertions, but continual monitoring, it
parallels the work of certain contemporary evolutionary psychologists, who speak of the
“mind reading” that goes on in everyday social interactions. By this they mean the
supposed unconscious decoding of those behaviors in others that betray their underlying
attitudes and intentions (e.g., Livingstone Smith 2004, p. 108).
But the problem is in trying to come up with a concrete version of this approach
that both makes sense and does not lead us into the same set of unfortunate issues as its
rival. The best version presented so far is Fricker’s. But even this very well-realized
account suffers from all sorts of difficulties that undermine its usefulness for the task at
hand.
First of all, there is the problem with the level of assessment that Fricker allows in
any particular situation. As she rightly acknowledges, in the course of everyday life, it
would be physically impossible for an individual to make a detailed assessment of every
speaker and her or his assertions. This is why she notes that MI5-style vettings are not in
order.
But what she replaces this with is something that hardly seems to be a form of
assessment at all. It is, rather, what she calls “interpretation”:
In recognizing an utterance by a speaker as a speech act of serious assertion, with a certain
content, a hearer is ipso facto engaging in a minimal piece of interpretation of the speaker –
ascribing to her an intentional action of a certain kind, and hence at the very least supposing the
existence of some configurations of beliefs and desires which explain that action. The theme of my
account is: the epistemically responsible hearer will do a bit more of the same. She will assess the
speaker for sincerity and competence, by engaging in at least a little more interpretation of her.
(Fricker 1994, p. 148)

Assessment, on such a view, thus turns out to be considerably less rigorous than one
might have expected. It is in fact an analogue of, or perhaps akin to, the fairly minimal
linguistic feat of understanding.
But Fricker takes her view even farther than this. For, she insists that this
interpretative level of assessment need not even be a conscious phenomenon. Instead, she
says, it is perfectly permissible for such assessments to rely on a variety of “cues” in a
speaker’s behavior that the addressee would be hard-pressed to formulate in any but the
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roughest manner. Even vague remarks like “I don’t like the look of him” or “Well, she
seemed perfectly normal” are allowable on Fricker’s account (Fricker 1994, p. 150). To
justify these sorts of judgments, all that is necessary is that the addressee be
…able to defend the judgement which is the upshot of this capacity [for unconsciously detecting
insincerity and incompetence], with the knowledge precisely that she indeed has such a capacity –
that ‘she can tell’ about that kind of thing; though she does not know how she does it. (Fricker
1994, p. 150)

Fricker is quick to point out that this view is not meant to be an invitation to
prejudice. It is not enough, she says, for a hearer to simply “feel funny” about a speaker.
Instead, that feeling must be grounded in the operation of a genuine “quasi-perceptual
capacity” (Fricker 1994, p. 150).
But it is difficult to see how such a capacity, even if it existed, could eliminate the
influence of potentially unjustified past generalizations regarding groups of persons. For,
presumably, in utilizing it, one would unconsciously rely on data generated from previous
encounters regarding tell-tale signs of insincerity and incompetence. And these could
well carry through to other encounters in ways that the addressee might not even
acknowledge or understand.
For example, a person of European descent could well through her or his
experience come over time to (unconsciously) use the habit of looking away from an
addressee when speaking as a cue for speaker insincerity. But, then, that same individual
could also have had experiences of Japanese students typically looking away from her or
him while speaking, with no apparent explanation for why this might be so. Over time,
unconsciously, the person of European descent then begins to associate Japanese speakers
with insincerity and so brings to testimonial encounters with them a completely innocent,
but flawed form of speaker assessment that is entirely based on a cultural
misunderstanding.
If anything, this situation is even worse than the one that can arise when
something like the default view of testimony is in place. For under that theory, one is at
least required to provide an overt reason for why one is suspending judgment on a
speaker’s assertions. But here the reason can be submerged in the very processes by
which one determines speaker status. In fact, there need not even be a reason involved.
In the example, it is the effect of the concatenation of two series of experiences on the
unconscious process of speaker interpretation that produces the undesirable outcome; not
anything that the addressee has to actually do or be responsible for.
The other problem with this account, at least as Fricker reconstructs it, is that it
does not genuinely separate out individual testimonial interactions in the way that it
would need to in order to get around the problem of potential addressee partisanship and
bigotry. Indeed, it cannot. As Fricker rightly remarks, any assessment that is done of
others’ sincerity and competence must rely on various bits of “background knowledge”
that the hearer or addressee has available (Fricker 1994, p. 148). And thus the question of
what it is acceptable to rely on here re-enters through the back door.
But to set things up otherwise would be to re-introduce the very problem that this
view was meant to avoid. It re-introduces the problem of gullibility. For, without access
to certain background beliefs about the speaker and about human psychology (broadly
conceived), along with a host of other topics and disciplines, the addressee is compelled
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to assess competence and sincerity in an evidential vacuum.
For many, assessing a speaker in this way may seem like an attractive option.
Even individuals of great power and responsibility have occasionally been taken with the
notion that all one needs to do in order to determine trustworthiness is to look deeply into
the soul of another. But it is hardly plausible. Background beliefs as a matter of fact will
and must penetrate any testimonial encounter and thus we are back to the issue with
which we began this paper.
PROPER EXPECTATIONS
In debates over the legal status of lesbian and gay relationships in the United States, a
common response among those who have organized politically against the legalization of
gay marriage is to deny that the testimony of gays and lesbians regarding their
experiences, actions, intentions, and goals is credible.
For example, according to the conservative Christian organization Focus on the
Family, the claim by many gays and lesbians that they have found romantic happiness
with someone of the same sex ought not to be taken at face value. Why? Because
…while homosexuals may be trying to convince themselves that what they are doing is acceptable
they have serious doubts in their hearts. (Myths and Facts About Homosexuality, n.d.)

Their claims, in other words, are not to be taken seriously because they are a consequence
of self-deception.
By the same token, there are many lesbians and gays who claim that their sexual
desires are not a choice, but that they seem to be a given, a part of who they are. This
claim too, says the organization, ought not to be accepted. Why? Because it is not made
in good faith; it is made in order to advance a particular political agenda.
The more the homosexual community can convince the general public that their homosexuality is
beyond their control, the more tolerance or even preferential treatment they can gain in public
policy. (Myths and Facts About Homosexuality, n.d.)

And, finally, there are many gays and lesbians who claim about themselves that
they are normal, psychologically healthy people with feelings and experiences just like
anybody else. But this claim is dubious as well. For in one way gays and lesbians are just
like anybody else. They “want to be accepted and appreciated”. As a result
They have been wounded by rejection and, in general, seem to say whatever it takes to be
considered “normal”. (Myths and Facts About Homosexuality, n.d.)

They are, in other words, just saying what they know everybody else wants to hear.
Part of the mission of organizations like Focus on the Family is to educate and
advise the public on a variety of contemporary political, religious, and moral issues.
Through their pamphlets, newsletters, advertisements, and websites, they hope to provide
models for public and private discourse on topics such as abortion, homosexuality,
immigration, the status of women, and the place of organized religion in American
political life. In addition, such organizations are involved in lobbying and grassroots
activism. And so they are also involved in providing through these various media a
9
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credible public case for their policy positions.
Needless to say, what is interesting about these responses, taken from the Focus
on the Family website, is the way in which they embody the sort of testimonial
interaction that I have in mind. They do so both within the context of providing a public
case for the organization’s positions and within the context of providing advice to those
ministers, counselors, parents, activists, and others who must respond to such claims as
they arise in the course of counseling sessions, private conversations, public policy
debates, and the like.
What these responses do within the context of the first is to undermine those
claims, made by some of the organization’s critics, that Focus on the Family irrationally
ignores both the essential nature of gays and lesbians and their underlying similarity to
the rest of the population. They do this by undermining the evidence that the critics
provide in those claims’ favor. For, as the organization sees it, such evidence is largely
derived from the testimony of gays and lesbians themselves. And it is for this reason
suspect, given, among other things, that it is produced by individuals that want to be
thought well of and that would be most affected by changes of policy in this area.
Within the context of providing advice, what these responses do is to empower a
host of individuals to replicate this sort of interaction at the personal and community
level. Individuals that find themselves in the role of addressee vis-à-vis a speaker making
claims of this kind will now be able to properly respond to such accounts – treating them
with the level of skepticism that they deserve and rightly expecting of certain speakers
that, due to their status, they will, when the subject comes up, most likely make firstperson reports of this kind.
The question, of course, is: is Focus on the Family on to something here? The
easy answer, the bien pensant answer, is to just say no. Such claims are based on pure
bigotry. And bigotry cannot be used to support such claims.
But the problem is that the situation is more complicated than that. For, in
presenting their public case, Focus on the Family does more than simply lay out a series
of assertions. They provide evidence in favor of them as well. For example, in favor of
the claim that lesbians and gays are unreliable testifiers when it comes to their romantic
happiness, they cite (among other things) a Columbia University study indicating a
significant amount of hostility among gays and lesbians towards other gays and lesbians.
In favor of the claim that they are unreliable when it comes to the exact status of their
sexual desires, the organization cites the testimony of professionals in the mental health
field and the first-person reports of so-called “ex-gays”. And finally, in favor of the claim
that they are unreliable when it comes to reporting their basic states of mind, the
organization cites the high rates of suicide, depression, anxiety, and addiction among
gays and lesbians that are widely acknowledged among researchers (Myths and Facts
About Homosexuality, n.d.).
Notice that in providing this evidence, there are several things that Focus on the
Family does right. First of all, in two of the cases, they rely upon properly conducted
surveys or polls of the populations in question. (The Columbia study was published as a
monograph in the volume Lesbian and Gay Psychology; the statistics on suicide, etc.,
come from the Archives of General Psychiatry.)
Secondly, the evidence that they provide is directly relevant to the question of
credibility in the target population. For, if it can be shown that a significant percentage of
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gays and lesbians are unhappy or unbalanced when they are claiming to be otherwise,
then there is a problem with the reliability of that kind of testimony. In such a situation,
what an addressee would want and expect would be corroboration up front, in terms of
specific information about the life and experiences of the testifier in question.
And finally, in terms of the motivations that the organization attributes to those
who are purportedly misrepresenting their experiences: while there is no direct evidence
in favor of their presence in these cases, the claim that they are there is a plausible
hypothesis, given the assumption that misrepresentation is going on. Through our
experience of ourselves and others, most of us tend to build up over the course of a
lifetime a fairly rudimentary person-theory. This is a basic set of propositions, mostly
unstated, about how a person operates. It includes our beliefs about such matters as how
far back a person can remember, how far away a person can see, and so on.
It also includes our beliefs about some of the standard strategies and responses
that persons are likely to engage in in certain standard situations. (It is on the basis of this
person-theory, for example, that we judge the verisimilitude of character-driven novels
and films.) And in cases of the kind that Focus on the Family is focusing on, selfdeception, partisanship, and a desire for acceptance seem likely in the situation in which
lesbians and gays find themselves – again, given the assumption that misrepresentation is
going on.
What the organization has, in other words, is the following:
(1)
A reason R to believe that the members of a target class C have to a
significant degree likely uttered falsehoods with respect to a range of topics T
based on the results of a properly conducted survey or poll of the members of
C, and
(2)
A reason R1 to believe that the members of a target class C will to a
significant degree likely continue to utter falsehoods with respect to a range of
topics T based on extensive personal observation and shared experience.
They have a reason to believe that the testimony of the members of C has in the past been
untrustworthy, based on the gap between that testimony and what the social science
evidence tells us about their actual experience. And they have a reason to believe that it
will likely continue to be untrustworthy, based on the likely explanation for that gap in
terms of common human frailties, brought out by gays and lesbians’ unique situation.
Having said all that, however, let me now point out what is wrong with the
evidence that Focus on the Family provides. And, in so doing, hopefully I will be able to
provide the outline of an answer to the problem with which I began this paper.
First off, there is nothing wrong, in my view, with Focus on the Family relying on
personal observation and shared knowledge to construct an account of the motivations
that lesbians and gays might have were they relaying false reports of their emotions and
experiences in the contested areas. Were we not able to rely on such informally gathered
information about persons and their behavior, we would have a very hard time navigating
through the world.
Indeed, there seems to be nothing wrong with relying on personal observation and
shared experience to construct “theories” that are much less general than an overall
theory of persons – the Manhattan police captain’s “theory” about the trustworthiness of
Romany fortunetellers, for example, or the “theory” of the mental health professionals
referred to by Focus on the Family who believe that not all gays and lesbians are telling
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the truth about the nature of their desires.
But there must be constraints on this method of gathering evidence. And these
constraints must be in the form of positive obligations placed upon the individual or
individuals doing the gathering. What are these obligations? There are at least two:
(1)
The individual I must non-culpably investigate the likelihood that her or
his generalization is a product of fallacious reasoning, and
(2)
The individual I must non-culpably investigate the likelihood that her or
his generalization is overturned or undermined by:
a. Evidence derived from properly conducted scientific research, or
b. Evidence derived from other persons’ personal observations and
shared experiences (also so constrained).
And the same applies to anyone using scientifically gathered evidence to make similar
claims.
Putting this together with the account of testimonial practice laid out above, what
we get is the following:
If, on an occasion O, H has evidence to believe that P solely on the basis of an
assertion by a speaker S to H that P, then, on O
(1)
S will have made an utterance U and in so doing “testified” that P to H,
and
(2)
H will be non-culpably unaware of the existence of
(a)
A reason R to believe that P is false or very unlikely,
(b)
A reason R, specific to S, to believe that S is insincere or
incompetent with respect to U,
(c)
A reason R to believe that the members of a class C to
which S belongs are to a significant degree insincere or
incompetent with respect to U:
a. Due in a pertinent way to their membership in C
when it comes to utterances of the same or a
very similar type as U on occasions of the same
or very similar type as O, and
b. Where R is based either on the results of a
properly conducted survey or polling of the
members of C with respect to their being
insincere or incompetent with respect to U or on
H’s extensive personal observation and shared
experience, provided that
i. H has non-culpably investigated the
likelihood that R is the product of
fallacious reasoning and found no reason
to think so, and
ii. H has non-culpably investigated the
likelihood that R is overturned or
undermined by other scientific research
and/or personal observation and shared
experience and found no reason to think
so.
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How does Focus on the Family’s position stand up on this standard? It does not
stand up very well. In the wealth of information that the organization presents on its
website, for example, there is no attempt to investigate or respond to other, more positive,
scientific research that has done on this topic. Nor is there any attempt to account for the
phenomena recorded there in ways other than those most congenial to the favored
hypothesis. (The Columbia study, for example, (Shidlo 1994) is actually about the topic
of internalized homophobia. This way of looking at the evidence provided by the study
raises the possibility of an accurate first-person account of day-to-day happiness which
co-exists with a socially imposed darker side over which one is also trying to gain
control.)
I have no doubt that, in using this standard, addressees will sometimes be able to
come to the conclusion that, with respect to this group of people, in this situation, on
these topics, they should expect a significant degree of falsehood and must demand
further evidence for any claims that are being made. In fact, I hope they will, since,
intuitively there are cases where this is right. Trudy Govier, in Chapter Nine of her book
Social Trust and Human Communities (Govier 1997), gives some searing examples that
would probably pass muster. Personally, I believe that we are at a point in the United
States where the proper attitude towards our government must be one of initial disbelief,
along the lines of Coady’s quote at the beginning of this paper.
But even so, the responsibility must always be to seriously canvas other evidence,
other explanations, and to hold our own reasoning processes to the highest standards of
evaluation. It must be to make “explicit”, as Jonathan Adler counsels, those processes and
mechanisms that “interfere with well-formed beliefs” (Adler 2002, p. 86).
link to commentary
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